Essay
Brand destruction is a market failure, not a leadership style
One cynical aphorism scores corporate leaders by how slowly they destroy the brand. It fits some firms uncomfortably well. What has to be true for it to fit at all?
One cynical aphorism about corporate leadership holds that a mid-twenty-first-century leadership team is best measured by how slowly it destroys the company’s brand: the slower the destruction, the better the leadership, because slower destruction extracts more rent. By this account, a team’s worth reduces to the rate at which it spends down something it did not create. The formulation treats a brand as an inherited stock of trust—goodwill banked over decades by predecessors—and casts present leadership as a custodian of its depletion whose only skill is pacing.
The aphorism bites because it is precise about rent. Economic rent is unearned return drawn from a position rather than from productive contribution, and a dominant brand is such a position: it confers pricing power and a standing presumption that the next purchase will resemble the last good one. A team that degrades the product while trading on residual reputation is monetizing the lag between perceived quality, anchored to the past, and actual quality, sliding in the present. That lag is the rent, and managing its width so customers notice late is the harvesting technique the aphorism rewards. Cory Doctorow’s account of platform enshittification describes the same mechanism—surplus shifted from users to business customers to shareholders until the trust is spent—and the financialized incumbent, with short executive tenures and equity-weighted pay, has every incentive to do this.
The claim is strongest read as a diagnosis of one class of firm: the mature, brand-rich incumbent shielded from serious competition. For legacy media, declining consumer platforms, private-equity-owned household names, and the airlines, the description is uncomfortably exact. Read as universal, the claim is wrong. Brands are replenished, rebuilt, occasionally created outright—Apple after 1997 and LEGO’s recovery from near-insolvency added to the stock of trust. A model with no room for replenishment has mistaken a particular pathology for the structure of the activity.
A sharper internal problem follows from the slowness criterion. Pushed to its limit, “slowly” approaches “not at all,” and a leader who never destroys the brand—who preserves it—scores best on the metric the aphorism proposes. The cynicism partly cancels itself: the measurement readmits the genuine steward it meant to deny, because infinitely slow destruction is indistinguishable from preservation. The aphorism wants destruction to be the universal verb and then supplies a scale on which the non-destroyer wins.
The word “better” is where the smuggling happens. Calling slow destruction “better leadership” holds only from the seat of the party collecting the rent; the same slowness, scored by the firm’s longevity or by its customers and workers, is still destruction, drawn out. The adjective carries a hidden beneficiary, and once that beneficiary is named the statement stops being a theory of leadership and starts describing who captures the surplus as a brand declines. The real subject is the allocation of a dwindling pool; leadership is cover.
Everything here depends on market power. Rent extraction requires a moat, because in a contested market a team that spends down its brand is overtaken by a rival that invests in one, and the slow-destruction strategy becomes slow suicide. Where the aphorism describes reality, it does so because competitive pressure has failed—concentration, network lock-in, switching costs, and regulatory capture have removed the discipline that would punish the harvester. The failure compounds in the market for corporate control. Once a moat makes the harvest safe, a buyer who plans to harvest can always outbid one who plans to steward, because extraction pays sooner; over enough sales, the brand ends up in harvesting hands. The statement reads as a thesis about executives, but the market they operate in sets its truth-conditions. How well it fits any given firm is a reading on how thoroughly that sector has neutralized competition. Where the aphorism sounds truest, something upstream of the boardroom has already gone wrong.
Sources:
- Cory Doctorow, Enshittification (MCD, 2025)